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Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives
Pedro Rey-Biely
Abstract
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity
as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A selshemployer can protably exploit such
preferences among its employees by o¤ering contracts which create inequity o¤-equilibrium
and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the
employers demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts,
and thus we derive conditions under which it may be benecial to form work teams of
employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar
results are obtained for status-seeking and e¢ ciency concerns preferences.
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1 Introduction
One of the most striking results from interview studies with rm managers and employees (Agell
and Lundborg (1999), Blinder and Choi (1990), Campbell and Kamlani (1997)) is that employees
report to care for the well being of their co-workers and not only for their own. In particular,
employees compare co-workersrewards and performance in the rm with their own. Bewley (1999)
shows that 69% of rmsmanagers interviewed o¤er formal pay structures because they can create
internal equity, which they believe employees care for. Asked why internal equity among employees is
relevant for them, 78% of managers answered that it was important for morale and internal harmony
and 49% responded that internal equity was key for job performance. Our aim is to capture how
managers should structure reward schemes when their employees care for the distribution of payo¤s
among their co-workers in a simple model.
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We discuss how contracts can exploit distributional preferences to the managers advantage. Our
main result is that a selshprincipal can devise schemes which exploit agentspreference for equity
by o¤ering them more equitable outcomes when managers demands are met than when they are
not. The reason is that equity a¤ects the employees incentives to work hard and thus, it a¤ects
job performance. Following Holmström and Milgroms (1991) seminal paper, optimal contracts must
account for everything employees care about. When agents care for equity the principal has two
instruments at its disposal: monetary rewards and equity. By o¤ering bonuses which generate more
equity when employees perform the e¤ort level desired by the manager than when they do not, the
manager does not need to pay as high monetary incentives for employees to meet its demands and
thus, he can elicit the desired e¤ort levels paying lower bonuses than would have been possible had the
agents not been inequity averse. Finally, because it may be relatively cheaper to provide incentives
for agents to work hard in joint projects, it may be optimal to form work teams.
Distributional preferences and fairness considerations are one of the most frequent explanations
of subjects behaviour in a wide variety of experiments.1 In prominent experimental work, Fehr
and Schmidt (2000) have argued that fairness lead principals to write incomplete contracts which
implement less severe incentives than conventional theory would predict. We develop a simple model
in which a principal has to design a reward scheme for two agents who dislike inequity in the way
envisaged by Fehr and Schmidt. However, the principal in our model is not distributional concerned
and agents do not care for the principals welfare, but only for the other agentsand their own. It
seems natural to assume that welfare comparisons are enhanced by how close the interaction between
agents is and that employees at the same hierarchical level interact more closely among themselves
than with their superiors. Additionally, employees performing similar tasks have better information
about each agentscost of e¤ort and nd it easier to learn about co-workersrewards than those of
their superiors, making welfare comparisons more accessible. Finally, sociologists have argued that
individuals rarely have altruistic feelings for others that have direct authority over their actions.2
Thus, utility comparisons seem more meaningful among employees on the same hierarchical level than
on di¤erent levels.3
We have chosen the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function as a reduced form of social preferences
due to its prominence and simplicity, although we later discuss status seeking and e¢ ciency concerns
preferences.4 Notice that we do not discuss more complicated forms of social preferences which include
reciprocal behaviour and intentions.5 These preferences could play a role if we studied repeated
interactions in the context of the rm. However, it would be crucial to study the reaction by agents
to threats of inequity by the principal, which in turn may imply that employees would care for the
1See, for example, Blount and Bazerman (1996), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
2See Homans (1950) and Festinger (1954) for a summary.
3Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000) express doubts on which variables would be used to compare employees and
employers utilities. They wonder how meaningful is to compare employeessalaries with rms prots or stock value.
4With simple parameter transformations we can obtain similar results for other types of distributional preferences
which might be relevant in the workplace. In particular, our qualtative results would hold for the models proposed
by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Bazerman, Loewenstein and Thompson (1989), Andreoni and Miller (1998), Cox and
Friedman (2002), and the model without intentions by Charness and Rabin (2002).
5For good surveys on social preferences see Sobel (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (2002b).
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intentions signalled by the employer, from which we want to abstract.
Our model is very stylized. First, we focus on incentive compatibility, not on participation. We
mainly discuss the case in which the participation constraint does not bind and thus both agents
work for the rm, possibly for a minimum wage. In particular, we show that the Principal benets
from inequity aversion when agents have a higher reservation utility than in any possible outside
option. Although we discuss the e¤ects of changes in the value of this reservation utility, there are
interesting cases in which the utility of working in a rm may be su¢ ciently higher than in any outside
option: search costs of nding a di¤erent job, good matching with employers, specic human capital,
disutility of unemployment or, as already said, the existence of minimum wages. We thus favour one
of the possible interpretations of our model as showing how optimal bonuses to provide incentives for
employees to perform an extra level of e¤ort should be designed when employees, who work in the
rm for a minimum wage, are inequity averse. Grund and Sliwka (2005) and Demougin and Fluet
(2003) have further studied the e¤ect of the participation constraint in tournaments among inequity
averse agents. Agell (2004) reports inequity aversion e¤ects among employees already working in real
rms.
Second, we do not consider an uncertain production environment. In our model output is de-
terministic and informative about the e¤ort level performed by each agent. We want to show how
inequity aversion in itself changes the optimal contract, without adding uncertainty. In a paper inde-
pendently written at the same time as this one, Itoh (2004) uses a model where output is uncertain
and shows that inequity aversion calls for optimal contracts to specify both agentsrewards under all
possible circumstances, which also occurs in our model. However, Itohs mechanism is di¤erent from
ours. In his model, each agent undertakes a di¤erent project and the principal writes the contract
such that both agents always perform high e¤ort. More equal (or more unequal) rewards are used in
Itohs paper to compensate for the risk of one of the agentsprojects failing. In our study, inequity
aversion determines in itself whether it is optimal to ask each agent to perform high or low e¤ort, as
we isolate its e¤ect from uncertainty. Thus, our model shows how inequity aversion can be a reason
to form work teams. We also show how unequal rewards must be optimally o¤ered o¤-equilibrium
to maximize the cost-saving e¤ect of inequity aversion. Once the pure e¤ect of inequity aversion on
contracts is understood, complementary approaches are emerging.6
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes
the optimal contract when agents have standard preferences. Section 4 characterizes the optimal
contract when agents are inequity averse, including a discussion on how participation constraints
a¤ect results. Section 5 discusses optimal contracts when distributional preferences take other forms,
such as status seeking and e¢ ciency concerns. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
6See Bartling and von Siemens (2004a,b), Cabrales et al. (2002), Dur and Glazer (2003), Englmaier and Wambach
(2002), Huck and Rey-Biel (2006) and Masclet (2002).
3
2 The Model
There are a Principal and two agents i; j 2 f1; 2g with i 6= j. Agents who work for the Principal (in
the rm) receive the same minimum wage equal to w > 0; production is normalized to K and agents
cost of working in this rm is normalized to 0: However, Agents can be asked to perform an extra
level of e¤ort (work hard) or not (shirk). If both agents work hard, the extra level of production is
normalized to 1 (joint extra production): If only agent i works hard, the extra level of production is qi;
where 0 < qi < 1 (individual production by agent i): If both agents shirk, the extra level of production
is 0: This extra level of output is observable and the extra level of e¤ort is veriable and contractible.
Alternatively, agents who are not in the rm have an outside option whose value is normalized to 0:
Each agents cost of working hard is ci > 0: The cost of shirking is 0. A complete contract
species the rewards (bonuses) o¤ered to both agents for all possible extra levels of output. In order
to standardize notation, assume the principal o¤ers bonuses {b1; b2} to agents 1 and 2 respectively
when both agents work hard, {b11; b
1
2} when only agent 1 works hard and {b
2
1; b
2
2} when only agent 2
works hard. If both agents shirk, bonuses are zero:7
The structure of the game is as follows: the Principal o¤ers bonuses for all possible production
levels, agents decide whether to enter the rm and then they simultaneously decide whether to work
hard or shirk. Once production is realized, promised bonuses for the output level obtained are paid.
Following Ma et al. (1988) we look at the contract such that the implemented production level is
the unique equilibrium of the game played by the agents.8 As the game is 2x2, the contract that
implements a unique equilibrium makes the game played by the agents dominance solvable.9
The Principal seeks to maximize its prot, that is, production (K), plus the extra production
minus rewards paid (bonuses plus minimum wages).10 Given the minimum bonuses needed to be
paid in equilibrium to implement each production level and the productivity parameters (qi and ci),
the Principal designs the contract that implements the level of extra production which maximizes its
prot. Two di¤erent specications for the agentsutility functions will be considered in Sections 3
and 4.
The structure of the game is known by the principal and the agents and, in particular, they both
know the bonuses o¤ered, the extra production level each agent achieves if working hard individually
and each agentscost of performing the extra e¤ort. Agents cannot communicate among themselves.
Assume the following.
7This is implied by assumptions (R1) and (R2) below.
8We do so in order to avoid the problem in Demski and Sappington (1984) that given an optimal contract there
may exist another pair of equilibrium strategies whose outcome, from the agentspoint of view, pareto dominates the
equilibrium outcome which the principal wants to implement and thus, the contract may not implement the optimal
output level.
9As we will see below, in all but one case, equilibrium uniqueness does not require to pay in equilibrium a higher
sum of bonuses than required to obtain the optimal output level as one of the possible equilibria of the game played by
the agents. Bonuses o¤ered o¤-equilibrium, however, may di¤er depending on whether the equilibrium implemented is
unique or not.
10We assume all production is sold at price equal to 1:
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(C) The sum of working agentscosts of extra e¤ort is lower than the extra output produced.
0  ci < qi;
ci + cj < 1; for i; j 2 f1; 2g with i 6= j:
(R1) AgentsLimited liability: Negative bonuses are not possible.
bi; b
i
i; b
j
i  0; for i; j 2 f1; 2g with i 6= j:
(R2) Bonuses are paid from the extra output produced.
bi + bj  1;
bii + b
i
j  qi; for i; j 2 f1; 2g with i 6= j:
(R3) The Principal wants both agents to work in the rm.
K  2w,
Assumption (C) implies that there always exists a surplus above the cost of e¤ort performed.
Assumption (R1) implies that bonuses are bonuses, that is, there exists limited liability constraints
restricting how much the principal can monetarily punish agents for not performing the extra e¤ort
required. Assumption (R2) is a budget constraint for the Principal, established at those levels for
simplicity. Limited liability and budgetary constraints are important for the o¤ers of the Principal to
be credible. Notice that (R1) and (R2) should also be satised o¤ the equilibrium of the game played
by the agents.11 Assumption (R3) ensures that the Principal is interested in hiring the two agents.
3 Optimal contract with standard agents
In this section we derive the optimal contract when agents are standard. Standard agents maximize
their utility which equals the minimum wage (w), plus their direct utility from the extra cost of
e¤ort, which equals the bonus they are o¤ered minus the cost of the extra e¤ort they may perform.
We rst solve for the optimal contract necessary to implement each extra level of production
and then, given the optimal bonuses, we derive conditions for each production level to be optimal.
Although the solution of this problem is straightforward, we solve it here as reference for the following
section.
3.1 Individual extra production with standard agents
The problem is the following:
11As it will be clear below, we impose budget constraints o¤-equilibrium to show the interesting interplay between
creating inequity o¤-equilibrium via envy or guilt. Without budget constraints, the Principal could o¤er innite bonuses
to one agent o¤-equilibrium, maximizing the other agents envy when not performing the optimal extra production level.
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-The principal maximizes its prot:
Max K + qi   bii   bij   2w
subject to:
- Assumptions (R1) and (R2).
- In equilibrium, agents prefer to work in the rm than taking the outside option:
w + bii   ci > 0;
w + bji > 0; for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
- Agent i prefers to work hard when agent j shirks: bii   ci  0:
- Agent j prefers not to work hard when agent i works: bij  bj   cj :
For the game to have a unique equilibrium with the lowest total reward cost paid by the principal,
the following constraints are also necessary:
- Agent j strictly prefers to shirk when agent i works hard: bij > bj   cj :
- Agent i strictly prefers to work hard when agent j works hard: bi   ci > bji :
- Agent j strictly prefers to work hard when agent i shirks: bjj   cj > 0:
The objective function and the restrictions are linear. Thus, the solution is straightforward:
bi 2 (ci; 1  bj ] bj 2 [0; cj);
bii = ci b
i
j = 0;
bji 2 [0; bi   ci) bjj 2 [cj ; qj   bji ) for i; j 2 f1; 2g with i 6= j:
The optimal contract is such that in equilibrium, the agent who individually works hard is exactly
compensated for its cost of e¤ort (bii = ci) while the agent shirking is paid no bonus (b
i
j = 0). The
principals prot in the unique equilibrium of the game is then equal toK+qi ci 2w: O¤-equilibrium
bonuses do not a¤ect the principals prots and thus, they can take any value in the intervals shown.
3.2 Joint extra production with standard agents
We here nd the optimal contract to implement joint extra production as the unique equilibrium of
the game played by the agents. The problem is the following:
-The principal maximizes its prot:
Max K + 1  b1   b2   2w
subject to:
- Assumptions (R1) and (R2).
- In equilibrium, agents prefer to work in the rm than taking the outside option:
w + bi   ci > 0; for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
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- Both agents prefer to work hard when the other agent works hard:12
bi   ci  bji for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
For the game to have a unique equilibrium with the lowest total reward cost paid by the principal,
the following constraints are also necessary:
- Let bi   ci > bji and bj   cj  bij then bii   ci < 0 and bjj   cj > 0:
Again, the objective function and the restrictions are linear so the solution is straightforward:
bi = ci + " bj = cj ;
bii 2 [0; ci) bij = 0;
bji = 0 b
j
j 2 (cj ; qj ]; for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
For joint extra production to be the unique equilibrium, it is necessary to add a negligible positive
quantity "! 0 to one of the agentsequilibrium bonuses. As it happened with individual production,
in an equilibrium with joint extra production agents are exactly compensated for their cost of extra
e¤ort.13 14 The principals prots in the unique equilibrium of the game are equal toK+1 c1 c2 2w.
3.3 Optimal production level with standard agents
Given that in equilibrium agents are paid a bonus exactly equal to their cost of extra e¤ort when
they work hard, the principal decides the optimal production level by comparing its prots when joint
extra e¤ort is implemented (K +1  c1  c2  2w) with its prots when individual extra e¤ort by the
agent with highest productivity net of its cost is implemented (K+qi ci 2w for qi ci  qj cj and
i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j). The conditions for each extra level of production to be optimal for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j;
are:
- Individual extra e¤ort by agent i if and only if qi   ci  qj   cj and qi  1  cj ;
- Individual extra e¤ort by agent j if and only if qi   ci < qj   cj and qj  1  ci;
- Joint extra e¤ort if and only if qi < 1  cj and qj < 1  ci :
4 Optimal contract with inequity averse agents
We follow Fehr and Schmidts (1999) model of inequity aversion by adapting their utility function to
our context with two agents. Inequity averse agentsutility function is UFSi where:
UFSi = w + Ui   max [Uj   Ui; 0]  max [Ui   Uj ; 0] for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j;
12From here onwards, we take the minimum wage (w) out of the incentive compatibility conditions of agents already
working in the rm.
13We assume " to be small enough such that prots and conditions for joint production to be optimal are not a¤ected.
14Notice that the most natural contract, paying both agents a bonus equal to their extra cost of e¤ort when they
work hard and o¤ering no bonus to an agent who shirks, does not implement a unique equilibrium in the subgame, as
no extra production would also be an equilibrium.
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where, as before, Ui is each agents direct utilityfor the extra cost of e¤ort and is equal to the
bonus o¤ered minus the cost of the extra e¤ort performed.1516
Assume the following:
(U1) Agents dislike inequity:   0 and   0:
(U2) Agents care more for their own direct utility than for inequity:  < 1 and   12 :
Assumption (U1) imposes inequity aversion. Agents derive disutility from direct utilities being
unequal. In the following,  refers to negative inequity aversion or envy (dislike to being worse o¤ than
your peers), while  refers to positive inequity aversion or guilt (dislike to being better o¤ than your
peers). We assume that parameters  and  are the same among agents for simplicity.17 Assumption
(U2) implies that agents care more for their own direct utility than for the comparison with the other
agents direct utility. Fehr and Schmidt allow for  > 1. We assume   1 to show that even if
inequity aversion is not dominant, its e¤ects on the optimal contract design can still be substantial.
Notice that   12 is also necessary for inequity aversion not to be dominant. Otherwise, agents would
be willing to transfer bonuses to the other agent ex-post. Additionally, Fehr and Schmidt impose
  , which we do not for generality.
In the following subsections we study how the principal can exploit this externality to its advantage.
We proceed as before, rst solving for the optimal contract for each extra level of production and then
discussing the conditions for each extra level of production to be optimal.
The following two subsections are written under the assumption that the participation constraints
hold, no matter how much disutility agents obtain from inequity. That is, we are assuming that the
minimum wage (w) is su¢ ciently high, such that agents prefer to work in this rm than taking the
outside option. The section concludes with a discussion of the e¤ects on optimal contract design of
such restriction not being satised.
4.1 Individual extra production with inequity averse agents
Dene ICCindi for i = 1; 2 as the constraints that make individual extra e¤ort by agent i incentive
compatible and ICCindUi as the constraints required for individual extra e¤ort to be the unique
equilibrium of the game played by the agents. The problem is the following:
-The principal maximizes its prot:
Max K + qi   bii   bij   2w
15While Fehr and Schmidts (1999) original formulation refers to agents comparing payo¤s, other authors using
their preferences in our context assume that only rewards enter into welfare comparisons but not the costs of e¤ort
(Grund and Sliwka (2002), Itoh (2004)). Our qualitative results hold with this alternative specication although more
interesting issues appear when e¤ort costs enter the comparison. Ultimately, this is an empirical question that may be
context dependent. A rst experimental study of this issue is Königstein (2000) who conrms that welfare comparisons
are context dependent.
16Minimum wages (w) are cancellled in the comparison among agents as they are assumed to be equal.
17We focus on asymmetries in productivity parameters instead than on social preferences assuming that they are
more easily observable and measurable.
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subject to:
- Assumptions (R1), (R2).
- In equilibrium, agents prefer to work in the rm than taking the outside option.
- (ICCindi ): b
i
i   ci   max[bij   bii + ci; 0]  max[bii   ci   bij ; 0]  0:
- (ICCindj ): b
i
j   max[bii   ci   bij ; 0]  max[bij   bii + ci; 0] 
bj   cj   max[bi   ci   bj + cj ; 0]  max[bj   cj   bi + ci; 0]:
For the game to have a unique equilibrium with the lowest total sum of bonuses paid by the
principal, the following constraints are also necessary:
- The inequality in condition (ICCindj ) is strict.
- (ICCindUi ): bi   ci   max[bj   cj   bi + ci; 0]  max[bi   ci   bj + cj ; 0] >
bji   max[bjj   cj   bji ; 0]  max[bji   bjj + cj ; 0]:
- (ICCindUj ): b
j
j   cj   max[bji   bjj + cj ; 0]  max[bjj   cj   bji ; 0] > 0:
We describe a property of the solution to this problem in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 To implement individual extra production when agents are inequity averse bonuses
paid in the equilibrium of the game played by the agents are the same as with standard agents (bii = ci
and bij = 0).
Intuitively, the agent who individually performs the extra e¤ort in the equilibrium of the game
must prefer to work hard than shirk, given that the other agent is shirking. Due to budget constraints
(R2), agents are not paid any bonus when they both shirk and thus, the utility of both agents when
they both shirk is the same and equal to w. Inequity generates disutility and because there is no
inequity when both agents shirk, it is optimal not to create inequity when only one agent works hard
(bii   ci = bij). Given that bonuses cannot be negative (Assumption (R1)), the minimum bonuses
needed to be paid such that agent i chooses to individually work hard are bii = ci and b
i
j = 0
and there is no inequity in equilibrium: For the game to have a unique equilibrium, bonuses o¤ered
o¤-equilibrium, i.e., when both agents work hard or when agent j individually works hard need to
satisfy the inequalities given by ICCindj , ICC
indU
i and ICC
indU
j . The proof of Proposition 1 rewrites
these conditions in a more compact form. Notice, as an example, that if o¤-equilibrium all agents
were o¤ered no bonus, i.e., b1 = b2 = b
j
i = b
j
j = 0, the equilibrium would not be unique. For the
equilibrium to be unique under the lowest total cost of bonuses for the principal, it is necessary that
working hard is a dominant strategy for the agent who individually works hard in equilibrium (agent
i) and thus, ICCindUi needs to hold. It is also necessary that the agent who shirks in equilibrium
(agent j) chooses to individually work hard when the other agent shirks and thus, ICCindUj is also
required.
4.2 Joint extra production with inequity averse agents
Dene ICCJPi as agent is incentive compatibility constraint for team extra level of production to be
an equilibrium of the game (not necessarily unique) and ICCJPUi as the constraints required for the
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equilibrium to be unique corresponding to agent i = 1; 2. The problem is the following:
-The principal maximizes its prot:
Max K + 1  bi   bj   2w
subject to:
- Assumptions (R1), (R2).
- In equilibrium, agents prefer to work in the rm than taking the outside option.
- (ICCJPi ): bi   ci   max[bj   cj   bi + ci; 0]  max[bi   ci   bj + cj ; 0] 
bji   max[bjj   cj   bji ]  max[bji   bjj + cj ]:
For the game to have a unique equilibrium with the lowest total sum of bonuses paid by the
principal, the following constraints are also necessary:
- Let the inequality in (ICCJPi ) for agent i be strict, while for agent j be weak.
Then:
(ICCJPUi ): b
i
i   ci   max[bij   bii + ci; 0]  max[bii   ci   bij ; 0] < 0;
(ICCJPUj ): b
j
j   cj   max[bji   bjj + cj ; 0]  max[bjj   cj   bji ; 0] > 0:
We solve this problem in Proposition 4. First, Propositions 2 and 3 state general results that
describe the worst possible punishment for each agent when they shirk. By punishing agents when
they shirk, agentsICCJPi s are relaxed and bonuses paid in equilibrium can be low.
Proposition 2 To generate the worst possible punishment to an inequity averse agent who shirks,
it is optimal to o¤er no bonus to the agent who shirks while the other agent individually works hard
(bji = 0).
The intuition behind this result is that due to limited liability (R1), bonuses o¤ered cannot be
negative, and due to (U2) agents care more for their direct utility than for the comparison with the
other agent, thus the disutility of an agent shirking is maximized when he is o¤ered no bonus.
Proposition 3 To generate the worst possible punishment to an inequity averse agent who shirks, it
is optimal to o¤er extreme bonuses to the agent who individually works hard (agent i). If the potential
e¤ect of envy on the shirking agent (j) is relatively high ((qi  ci)  ci), agent i must be o¤ered all
the extra output when he individually works hard (bii = qi). If, in contrast, the potential e¤ect of guilt
is relatively high ((qi   ci) < ci), agent i must be o¤ered no bonus when he individually works hard
(bii = 0).
Agent j derives disutility both from envy and guilt, but not from both at the same time. The
punishment from envy is maximized when the other agent is o¤ered all available extra output (bii = qi),
and thus the maximum disutility generated by envy is equal to (qi   ci). The punishment from
guilt is maximized when the other agent is not o¤ered any bonus when he performs the costly extra
e¤ort ( bii = 0). Thus the maximum disutility generated by guilt equals ci: Therefore, the relevant
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comparison is (qi   ci) T ci: Using Propositions 2 and 3 the envious agent j obtains minimum
utility when he shirks and agent i works because not only he does not get any reward (by Proposition
2), but experiences the maximum feasible envy as agent i is paid the maximum available reward. On
the other hand, the guilty agent j obtains minimum utility when he shirks because not only he is paid
no bonus but he also experiences the maximum feasible guilt because agent i is performing a costly
e¤ort and is paid the lowest feasible bonus, which given (R1) is zero.
Notice that without budget constraints and limited liability, the potential to maximize the pun-
ishment from envy and guilt would be less limited. The principal could threat an agent who shirks
by o¤ering the other agent an even higher bonus when he individually works (to maximize envy) or
o¤er a negative bonus, a penalty (to maximize guilt). As previously discussed, we have assumed (R1)
and (R2) to restrict attention to limited and credible threats of inequity.
We nally look at the optimal contract to implement joint production. The following Proposition 4
shows the optimal bonuses for all levels of extra production when joint extra production is implemented
as the unique equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 4 To implement joint extra production when agents are inequity averse, the optimal
contract is as follows:
1. An agent who shirks is o¤ered no bonus (bji = b
i
j = 0).
2. Case a) If the maximum feasible punishment for both shirking agents is generated via envy
((qi  ci)  ci for i = 1; 2), both agents are o¤ered all available extra output when they individually
work hard (bii = qi and b
j
j = qj).
Case b) If the maximum feasible punishment for one shirking agent (i) is generated via envy
and for the other agent (agent j) is generated via guilt ((qj   cj)  cj and (qi   ci) < ci for
i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j), then one agent is o¤ered all available extra output when he individually works hard
(bjj = qj) while the other agent is o¤ered no bonus when he individually works hard (b
i
i = 0).
Case c) If the maximum feasible punishment for both shirking agents is generated via guilt
((qi  ci) < ci for i = 1; 2), then one agent is o¤ered all available extra output when he individually
works hard (bjj = qj) while the other agent is o¤ered no bonus when he individually works hard (b
i
i = 0).
Which agent is o¤ered all available extra output is determined by the relative maximum e¤ect of guilt
and envy for each agent.
3. Indi¤erence between working hard and shirking when the other agent works hard determines the
bonuses agents are paid in equilibrium (bi and bj), as long as bonuses are positive. Otherwise, agents
are paid no bonus (bi = 0 for i = 1; 2).
The intuition for this result is as follows. First, following Proposition 2 an agent who shirks when
the other agent individually works hard is o¤ered no reward (bji = b
i
j = 0). This minimizes agents
direct utility when they shirk, providing more incentives for them to work hard. Second, the utility
of a shirking agent can be further minimized by creating inequity through the reward o¤ered to the
agent who individually works hard. Following Proposition 3 the shirking agent obtains minimum
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utility when the agent who individually works hard is o¤ered extreme bonuses, i.e., either all available
extra output (bii = qi) or no bonus at all (b
i
i = 0). this is determined by whether (qi   ci) R ci.
In cases a) and b) in Proposition 4, it is optimal to maximize the punishment to the shirking
agent and thus, extreme bonuses are o¤ered to the agent who individually works hard. In case c) it is
not optimal to maximize the punishment to the shirking agent as the equilibrium of the game played
by the agents would not be unique. Both agents shirking would also be an equilibrium in which the
utility of both agents would pareto dominate the utility when they both work and thus, the principal
would not be certain that such contract would implement joint production when it is optimal to do
so. The expression for the bonuses paid in equilibrium in each of the three cases is shown in the proof
of Proposition 4, although we here explain case b) graphically.
Case b) shows the optimal bonuses paid when it is optimal to exploit agent is envy and agent js
guilt, and thus, it is optimal to o¤er all available extra output to agent j when he individually works
hard (bjj = qj) and no bonus to agent i when he individually works hard (b
i
i = 0). Equilibrium bonuses
are obtained by equating the utility of each agent when both agents work hard to the utility of each
agent when they shirk given that the other agent individually works hard. Indi¤erence curves are
drawn in Figure 1 below as combinations of bi and bj such that agentsutility when they both work
hard is the same as when they shirk and the other agent individually works hard. The principal seeks
to maximize prots and thus, chooses equilibrium bonuses such that both agentschoose to work hard
(which occurs in the shaded area in Figure 1) and such that the sum of equilibrium bonuses is the
minimum possible. Given the slopes of the indi¤erence curves dened by (U1) and (U2), this occurs
at the unique point at which both agentsindi¤erence curves intersect. Figure 1 shows the case were
(qj   cj)  ci and thus, agent i su¤ers more from envy when he individually shirks than agent
j su¤ers from guilt when he individually shirks. Therefore, equilibrium wages are on the left hand
side of the 45o line implying that in equilibrium agent i obtains less direct utility than agent j. A
symmetric graph can be drawn for the case (qj   cj) < ci:
bi - ci
bj - cj
45º
(ß/ a)ci
qj -cj
-(a/ß)(qj –cj)
- ci
Agent i’s indifference curve
Agent j’s indifference curve
Equilibrium bonuses
Figure 1: Equilibrium bonuses when envy dominates for agent i, guilt dominates for agent j and
(qj   cj) > ci
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Finally, using the results of Proposition 4 we conclude the following:
Corollary 1 The principal obtains higher prots when implementing joint production with inequity
averse agents than with standard ones.
Intuitively, the principal could always implement joint production by exactly compensating both
agents for their cost of e¤ort when they work hard, and o¤ering them no reward when they shirk.
The reason is that in equilibrium, when both agents are exactly compensated for their costs of e¤ort,
there is no inequity and thus, utilities are the same as direct utilities. In particular, as we discuss
below, this is what will happen when w is not high enough for the participation constraint to be
satised. However, when w is su¢ ciently high, the principal can do better than exactly compensate
agentscosts of extra e¤ort. Following Propositions 2 to 4 , the principal can generate inequity o¤
the equilibrium of the game such that inequity averse agentsutilities are lower than standard agents
direct utilities. Thus, by paying agents a bonus lower than their cost of extra e¤ort but maintaining
more equity in equilibrium than o¤-equilibrium, joint production is optimally implemented at a lower
total cost for the principal than with standard preferences.
Notice that each agentsequilibrium bonuses are not necessarily lower than in the standard case,
but the sum of the two bonuses paid is. This does not mean that equity is maximized when joint
extra production is implemented nor that bonuses paid in equilibrium are the same for both agents.
Bonuses paid just need to be su¢ ciently close for both ICCJPi s to hold at the lowest total cost of
bonuses in equilibrium for the principal.
4.3 Optimal production level with inequity averse agents
We here look at the conditions for each level of extra production to be optimal and, in particular we
state the main result of this paper.
Proposition 5 Inequity aversion may be in itself a reason to demand joint extra production by agents
who compare themselves, even if the productivity of some agents is low.
Notice that from previous results it is obvious that whenever the conditions for joint extra pro-
duction to be optimal with standard agents are satised (qi < 1   cj for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j ) it is still
optimal to implement joint extra production when agents are inequity averse. However, while the
total sum of bonuses needed to be spent in equilibrium to implement individual production is the
same with standard and inequity averse agents, from Corollary 1 the total sum needed to implement
joint extra production may be lower with inequity averse agents. Thus, it is possible that under same
values for the productivity parameters, it may be optimal to implement individual production by
standard agents while it may be optimal to implement joint extra production with inequity averse
agents. Obviously, changes of equilibrium implemented from individual production by one agent to
individual production by the other agent are not possible. The proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix
shows the conditions under which each level of extra production are optimal.
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Notice that our argument relies on welfare comparisons among all agents working in the rm.
Therefore, our model should be interpreted as employees working in the rm who compare each
otherswelfare, no matter if they are asked to perform the extra level of e¤ort or not. The design of
optimal bonuses taking into account such welfare comparisons allows the Principal to decide whether
it is preferable to demand an extra level of e¤ort from an individual or from a group of agents.
Our main result shows that even if due to strictly productive reasons it may not be desirable to ask
unproductive agents to perform the extra level of e¤ort, the fact that other agents doing the extra
level of e¤ort compare their welfare with that of the unproductive ones may be a reason in itself to
demand extra levels of e¤ort from both types of agents. This is due to the possibility of obtaining
higher extra output at a lower cost in bonuses than when agents do not compare their welfare.
4.4 E¤ects of the Participation Constraint on Optimal Contracts
Up until now, we have assumed that the minimum wage (w) when working in the rm was high
enough such that in equilibrium agents preferred to be in the rm than taking the outside option.
We have obtained however, that with inequity aversion agents in the rm may derive disutility from
welfare comparisons with other agents in the rm and thus, if the minimum wage is not su¢ ciently
high, they may prefer to quit the rm and take the outside option. Therefore, the exogenous value of
the minimum wage limits the extend up to which inequity aversion can be exploited by the Principal
to obtain and extra level of e¤ort from both agents at a total sum of bonuses that may not cover each
agentsindividual cost of performing the extra level of e¤ort.
We here look at the conditions on the participation constraints for the case when it is optimal to
demand an extra level of e¤ort from both agents. This is the most relevant one as it is the case where
inequity aversion may change the optimal output decision by the Principal.
Assume that agent i shirks o¤-equilibrium and that (qj   cj)  cj for i 6= j: Thus, due to
incentive compatibility reasons it would be optimal to make agent i envious and o¤er all individual
extra output to the agent who works hard o¤-equilibrium (bjj = qj). However, given that it is still
optimal to o¤er no reward to the shirking agent (bji = 0), the participation constraint of the shirking
agent will not hold when:
w < (qj   cj):
In such cases, the maximum bonus that can be o¤ered to agent j when individually doing the
extra e¤ort such that the participation constraint of the shirking agent holds is bjj =
w
 + cj > 0.
Notice that this creates exact equality when agent i shirks and thus, the minimum bonus cost of
providing incentives to agent i to work hard, given that agent j also works hard would be the same
as with standard agents: Alternatively, the Principal could make agent i feel guilt when shirking by
setting bjj = 0: This creates inequity o¤-equilibrium and thus, the possibility of a lower bonus to
provide incentives to agent i:However, bjj = 0; will only satisfy agent is participation constraint for
su¢ ciently high w;in particular for w > cj : Otherwise, the Principal must set b
j
j = cj and as there
is no inequity when only agent i shirks, bi = ci: Thus, for low enough w, inequity aversion does not
decrease the cost of implementing joint extra e¤ort by agent i.
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Assume now that agent i shirks o¤-equilibrium but that (qj   cj) < cj for i 6= j: It is still
optimal to o¤er no reward to the shirking agent (bji = 0). Thus, due to incentive compatibility
reasons it would be optimal to make agent feel i guilty and o¤er no bonus to the agent who works
hard o¤-equilibrium (bjj = 0). Notice that if b
j
j = 0; agent js participation constraint would not hold
unless w  (1 + )cj . This is not important since participation constraints only need to hold in the
implemented equilibrium (joint extra production) and, given the incentive compatibility constraints,
also for the agent who shirks o¤-equilibrium (i) but not for the agent who individually works o¤-
equilibrium (j).18 But when bjj = 0 the participation constraint of agent shirking o¤-equilibrium only
holds for su¢ ciently high w;in particular for w > cj : Otherwise, the Principal must set b
j
j = cj and
as there is no inequity when only agent i shirks, bi = ci: Thus, equivalently, for low enough w, inequity
aversion does not decrease the cost of implementing joint extra e¤ort by agent i.
Ultimately, for a low enough w, and in particular, for w  cj ; it may not be possible to create
inequity o¤-equilibrium (bjj = cj and b
j
i = 0), and the joint extra level of e¤ort will be implemented
by paying exactly the same bonuses as when agents are not inequity averse. In that case, inequity
averse agents will be paid a bonus equal to their cost of e¤ort when they work hard, and there will
be no inequity in equilibrium. Therefore, the extent to which agents derive utility when working
in the rm for a minimum wage, either because of a minimum wage or other reasons, determines,
together with their degree of inequity aversion and their productivity parameters, the extent up to
which distributional preferences can be exploited by the Principal.
Finally, notice that when normalizing the value of the outside option to zero, we are implicitly
assuming that the extent to which agents su¤er from utility comparisons when taking the outside
option is more limited than inside the rm. However, it is still very plausible that agents would su¤er
from utility comparisons outside the rm. For example, they may feel guilty for leaving other agents
behind, or they may be employed in a di¤erent rm in which distributional concerns are equally
exploited. In such cases, the value of the outside option would be lower with respect to the rm,
opening again the possibility of exploiting inequity aversion inside the rm.
5 Status and E¢ ciency seeking Preferences
It can be argued that in some contexts, other types of distributional preferences might be more relevant
than inequity aversion. In particular, in very competitive rms, agents might not dislike inequity but
instead they might enjoy it, at least as long as it is the other agent who is worse o¤ than them.
Such agents will not feel guilt but spite when being better o¤ than their peers, while they will still
feel envious when being worse o¤. We call these agents Status Seeking, interpreting having higher
status as being higher in the ranking of agentswelfare, i.e., as being better o¤ than other agents.
In other contexts in which each agent contributes a lot to total production, agents might feel
disutility when shirking because the total amount of extra output, and thus, the total amount of
bonuses available to be distributed among agents, gets smaller when they shirk. We call these agents
18Although when bjj = 0 and b
j
j = 0 joint extra production may not be an unique equilibrium, as both agents will
prefer to shirk given that the other agent is shirking. This the same problem that arises in Case c) of Proposition 4.
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E¢ ciency Seeking, interpreting e¢ ciency as the sum of agentswelfare net of the costs of the extra
level of e¤ort.19
Following Charness and Rabin (2002), by simply changing the range of values parameters  and 
in the Fehr and Schmidt utility function can take, it is possible to look at the array of possible purely
distributional concerns in a unied model. We thus use a re-parametrization of the Fehr and Schmidt
model to explore its consequences in optimal contract design.
5.1 Reward Design with Status Seeking Preferences
Assume now that  2 [0; 1),  < 0 and jj  1: This means that agents are still averse to disadvanta-
geous inequity but like advantageous inequity. The following two propositions cover the key issues of
contract design when agents are status seeking, assuming one again that the participation constraint
is satised.
Proposition 6 To implement individual production when agents are status seeking, bonuses paid in
the equilibrium of the game are the same as with standard agents (bii = ci and b
i
j = 0).
As it happened with inequity averse agents, the optimal contract to implement individual extra
production implies paying the agent who individually works hard (i) a bonus exactly equal to its cost
of performing extra e¤ort (ci) and paying no bonus to the shirking agent. The reason is that in the
right hand side (RHS) of ICCindi there is no production and thus, both agents are paid no bonus and
no agent is ahead. One could argue that since agent i likes being better o¤ than its peer, it would
be easier to provide incentives for agent i to work hard by making him better o¤ than agent j when
agent i individually works. However, given that it is still optimal to pay no bonus to agent j when he
shirks (due to (R1) the principal cannot pay him less), the only way to make agent i better o¤ than
agent j is by o¤ering a bonus to agent i above its cost of performing the extra e¤ort, which cannot
be optimal.
We now look at the optimal contract to implement joint production.
Proposition 7 To implement team production when agents are status seeking the sum of bonuses
paid in equilibrium is lower than with standard agents. The optimal contract is as follows:
bi = ci   
2(qi ci) ( 1)(qj cj)
+(1 ) < ci bj = cj +
(qj cj) (1+)(qi ci)
+(1 ) < cj ;
bii = qi b
i
j = 0;
bji = 0 b
j
j = qj ; for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
Notice that to implement team production, the only way to use inequity o¤ the equilibrium of the
game is by generating disutility via envy on the agent who shirks, and thus it is optimal to o¤er no
bonus to the agent who shirks and all individual output to the agent who individually works hard.
The reason is that spite provides utility to the shirking agent, making its ICCJPi more di¢ cult to
19 In fact, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) nd in a comparative test of distributional preferences that in the laboratory
most data are better explained by e¢ ciency concerns than by other distributional preferences such as inequity aversion.
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hold. Rewards paid in the equilibrium of the game are dened by case a) in the proof of Proposition
4. Now things are even better for the principal. As agents like to be better o¤ than each other, the
bonus paid in equilibrium to the agent who is best o¤ is lower than with inequity aversion. Notice
that as in case a) in Proposition 4, the agent who su¤ers more from envy o¤-equilibrium is the one
who will optimally be worse o¤ in the equilibrium, i.e., if qj   cj  qi   ci then the optimal bi and bj
are such that bj   cj  bi   ci: Finally, notice that with status seeking agents when team production
is implemented, both agents are paid in equilibrium a bonus lower than their cost of e¤ort.
Following results in section 4.3, the principal nds it optimal to implement team production when
qi > 1   cj + (1 2)(qj cj)+(1+2)(qi ci) 1  for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: Otherwise, the principal implements
the individual extra level of production by the agent for which qi   ci is highest.
5.2 Reward Design with E¢ ciency Seeking Preferences
Assume now that  < 0;  2 [0; 1=2); and jj  jj : This implies that agents care for the weighted
sum of direct utilities, putting more weight on each owns direct utility than on the other agents
direct utility. this leaves the possibility for the principal to exploit e¢ ciency seeking preferences. The
following two Propositions cover the key issues of contract design when agents are e¢ ciency seeking.
Proposition 8 To optimally implement individual extra level of production when agents are e¢ ciency
seeking, the sum of bonuses paid in the equilibrium of the game is the same as with standard agents
(bii + b
i
j = ci)
Intuitively, the agent who individually works hard in equilibrium (agent i) must choose to work
hard given that agent j shirks. When both agents shirk bonuses are zero and thus, agent i should
obtain positive utility when working hard for its ICCindi to hold. However, the only way to use
that agent i is e¢ ciency concerned to implement an equilibrium in which i individually works hard
and paying a lower bonus than its cost of e¤ort is by o¤ering more e¢ cient bonuses. i.e., a total
sum of bonuses that adds up to more than agent is cost of performing the extra e¤ort. This is a
contradiction. Thus, individual extra level of production cannot be implemented with a total sum of
bonuses paid in equilibrium lower than the cost of the extra e¤ort of the agent who individually works
hard. Notice that with e¢ ciency seeking agents equilibrium bonuses are not necessarily equal to the
cost of e¤ort of the agent who individually works hard, although the sum of bonuses paid must be
equal to it.
We now look at the optimal contract to implement the team extra level of production.
Proposition 9 To optimally implement team production when agents are e¢ ciency seeking the sum
of bonuses paid in equilibrium is lower than with standard agents. The optimal contract is as follows:
bi = ci +
2
+(1 )ci > ci bj = cj   (1 )+(1 )ci < cj ;
bii = 0 b
i
j = 0;
bji = 0 b
j
j = cj ; for ci > cj :
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Contrary to previous sections, now extreme rewards (all production or no production at all) are
not o¤ered to all agents o¤ the equilibrium of the game. In particular, agent j is o¤ered a bonus
equal to its cost of e¤ort when he individually works hard (bjj = cj;). The reason is that o¤ering no
bonus to all agents o¤ equilibrium, the equilibrium of the game would not be unique. Notice that if
bii = b
i
j = b
j
i = b
j
j = 0, then no extra production is clearly an equilibrium of the game, as agents obtain
the same bonuses when they both shirk than when they individually work hard and there is more
e¢ ciency when they both shirk, as bonuses are the same and equal to zero but no agent performs the
extra level of costly e¤ort. To obtain uniqueness, it is necessary to o¤er a bonus that compensates one
agent for its cost of e¤ort when he individually works hard, in order for him to choose to work hard,
given that the other agent is shirking. The choice of which agent is o¤ered a bonus equal to its e¤ort
cost when individually working hard is determined by agentscosts of e¤ort. Notice that Proposition
9 says that the agent who has a smaller cost of extra e¤ort (agent j) is the one that must be o¤ered a
bonus equal to its cost of extra e¤ort when he individually works hard. The reason is that, by o¤ering
a bonus equal to zero to the agent with highest cost (bii = 0), the principal creates more ine¢ ciency o¤-
equilibrium and thus implement team extra level of production as the unique equilibrium of the game
with the lowest possible total sum of bonuses paid. Also notice that the agent with the highest cost is
paid in equilibrium a bonus higher than its cost of e¤ort (bi = ci +
2
1+  ci > ci as  <
1
2 ;
 < 12 ),
while the other agent is paid a bonus su¢ ciently lower than its cost of e¤ort (bj = cj  (1 )1+  ci < cj),
such that the total sum of bonuses paid in equilibrium is lower than the sum of both agentscost of
performing the extra e¤ort (bi + bj < ci + cj):
Finally, it is optimal to implement team production when agents are e¢ ciency concerned whenever
1   cj + (1 2)1+  ci > qi and 1   ci + (1 2)1+  ci > qj for ci > cj : If these conditions are not satised,
the principal implements individual production by the agent for which qi   ci is highest.
6 Discussion
Our model o¤ers two novel results. First, if welfare comparisons among employees exist within the
rm, they should not be ignored and contracts should specify rewards for all agents under all possible
circumstances. Second, optimally taking into account the design of bonuses o¤ered to distributionally
concerned employees may provide a new reason by itself to demand joint e¤ort, even when e¤orts are
not complementary or there are no informational problems.
We have chosen the simplest possible model in which such points can be made. First we have
focused on incentive compatibility instead of on participation because there are realistic situations in
which employers cannot force employees down to their participation constraint. Our model uses a
minimum wage for the participation constraint to be satised and discusses the e¤ects of changes in this
minimum wage. Other alternatives such as reservation utilities, search costs of new jobs, disutility of
unemployment or good matching with the employer would produce the same results. Taken together,
our results imply that the more attached employees are to their jobs, the more the employer can
exploit their inequity concerns. Notice that the analysis of the participation constraint is specially
tricky when dealing with interdependent preferences because it is not clear what the reference point
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is when the agent takes the outside option. In particular, a more careful analysis of the participation
constraint should make strong assumptions on whether agents feel equally inequity averse when in
other rms or whether they may feel envious or guilty for other agents left behind in the original rm.
As this behavioural questions are unresolved yet, we have focused on incentive compatibility.
Second, we have abstracted from uncertainty in production to be able to discuss the pure e¤ect
of inequity aversion. We argue that inequity aversion is in itself a possible reason to demand joint
production, whether output is deterministic or not, and we show how the optimal contract must be
changed accordingly. The closely related paper by Itoh (2004), makes a di¤erent point: when inequity
averse agents participate in di¤erent projects which can succeed or fail, more equal (or unequal
contracts) must be o¤ered to compensate for the risk of the other agents project falling. Thus, Itoh
uses equality in rewards to compensate for uncertainty while our model shows how rewards must
be allocated to provide extra incentives to work harder even if employers are restricted by limited
liability. There are many real situations in which an extra level of e¤ort may produce a deterministic
output, such as staying longer hours in the o¢ ce or contributing to the administrative duties of a
department. What we argue is that if employers realize that their employees feel envy, guilt, spite or
e¢ ciency concerns, they may not need to pay a bonus covering the cost of those extra hours or those
extra duties, as long as threats of inequity when they shirk are optimally designed.
Despite its simplicity, our model provides a new rationale for team and relative performance
contracts in contexts with no informational asymmetries. In both these types of contracts, agents are
threatened with welfare inequities when some employees work harder than others. In team contracts,
when a member of the team shirks, the teams performance is less successful and thus, other members
of the team who work hard do not see their e¤orts rewarded, for which the shrinking agent might
feel guilty. Therefore, agents might decide not to shirk even if rewards o¤ered to them are low in
order to avoid feeling guilty for the members of the team who work hard. In relative performance
contracts, when an agent shirks hard he will be ranked low, and thus, he will be worse o¤ than higher
ranked agents, for which he may actually feel envious. Thus in competitive contexts it may not be
necessary to o¤er such high rewards when agents are envious of each other and compete not to be
ranked lower than their peers. Thus, welfare comparisons among peers can be used by the employer
to provide incentives to work hard. Our results show that team and relative performance contracts
may be optimal even in many work situations in which output is deterministic and/or e¤ort is easily
observable by managers.
Our model highlights how behavioural Contract Theory can be useful to study issues of organi-
zation in the rm. Both the Human Resources Literature and the Personnel Economics Literature
have studied these issues before.20 The contribution of our study is that it indicates how comparisons
among agents can be a¤ected by the design of the contract. Our model suggests that optimal contracts
may depend on the strength of welfare comparisons. If that is the case, it may be possible to a¤ect
the strength of those comparisons in the workplace. We have here assumed everything was given
and observable. However, in real rms the employer might be able to inuence which information is
20See Lazear (1995).
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easily available to its employees, once it has been claried which variables enter employeeswelfare
comparisons in di¤erent contexts. In particular, decisions such as whether to make salaries publicly
available to co-workers or not, or the allocation of o¢ ce space (which might a¤ect the observability of
e¤ort by co-workers) could be illuminated by issues here discussed. Although in many rms rewards
are kept secret21 and employees work in separate and closed o¢ ces, we have here provided a factor
that in some cases may push towards the opposite direction.
7 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Bonuses paid in the equilibrium of the game played by the agents (bii; b
i
j) appear in ICC
ind
i . By
(R2) the value of the right hand side of ICCindi is zero and both agents obtain the same utility when
they both shirk. By (U1)  and  are positive. By choosing bii   ci = bij , the terms that compare
direct utilities in ICCindi are equal to zero and do not subtract utility in the Left Hand Side of the
condition. The principals objective is to maximize qi   bii   bij : By setting bii = ci and bij = 0 the
principal maximizes prots with ICCindi holding.
For individual production by agent i to be an equilibrium, ICCindj needs also to hold. The
following inequalities dene the o¤-equilibrium bonuses for ICCindj , ICC
indU
i and ICC
indU
j to hold,
with bij = 0, which is the lowest possible bonus paid to agent j in equilibrium. The restrictions
shown are the result of rearranging conditions ICCindj , ICC
indU
i and ICC
indU
j and simplifying the
terms that compare direct utilities. There are four cases depending on whether bi   ci 7 bj   cj and
bji 7 b
j
j   cj : Of these four cases, the combination bi   ci < bj   cj and bji > bjj   cj violates ICCindj if
ICCindUi and ICC
indU
j hold and thus this case is removed, and we are left with a1), a2) and b):
a) If bjj   cj  bji then: bjj   cj >  1  bji and
a1) If bj   cj  bi   ci then: bi   ci > bji + 1+ (bj   bjj)
and bj   cj < 1  (ci   bi);
a2) If bj   cj < bi   ci then: bi   ci > 11  [(1 + )bji   (bj   cj)  (bjj   cj)]
and bj   cj < 1+ (bi   ci):
b) If bji > b
j
j   cj then: bi   ci > bji + 1  (bjj   cj); bj   cj < 1+ (bi   ci) and
bjj > cj +

1+b
j
i :
Proof of Proposition 2
Agent is utility when he shirks, given that agent j works is:
K + bji   max
h
bjj   cj   bji ; 0
i
  max
h
bji   bjj + cj ; 0
i
  w:
Notice that inequity aversion imposes that an agent obtains disutility either from being better o¤
or worse o¤ than the other agent, but not from both at the same time.
21Even if Bewley (1999) reports that 87% of managers interviewed think that their employees know each others
wages.
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a) If agent i is worse o¤ than agent j, the e¤ect of envy dominates and bjj   cj   bji  0:
Thus, to minimize the utility of agent i when he shirks, bji = 0, as the derivative of agent
is utility with respect to the bonus o¤ered to agent j equals 1 +  > 0; by assumption
(U1):
b) If agent i is better o¤ than agent j, the e¤ect of guilt dominates and bji   bjj + cj  0:
Thus, to minimize the utility of agent i when he shirks, bji = 0, as the derivative of agent
is utility with respect to the bonus o¤ered to agent j equals 1    > 0, by assumption
(U2).
Proof of Proposition 3
By Proposition 2, the bonus that maximizes agent js punishment when agent i individually works
hard is bij = 0:
The utility of agent j when agent i individually works hard is thus equal to:
K   max bii   ci; 0  max  bii + ci; 0  w
where by (R1) and (R2),
bii 2 [0; qi] ;
and by (C),
0  ci  qi:
Thus, minimizing agent js utility implies:
bii = qi if (qi   ci)  ci
and
bii = 0 if (qi   ci) < ci:
Proof of Proposition 4
First, from Proposition 2 it is optimal not to bonus agents when they shirk, in order to create
incentives for both agents to work.
bji = b
i
j = 0:
We now show the remaining bonuses in each of the three cases referred in Proposition 4.
Case a): If (qi   ci)  ci for i = 1; 2, it is optimal to choose bii = qi: Conditions (ICCJPU )s
hold using results in Proposition 2. The principal maximizes 1   b1   b2 subject to both (ICCJP )s.
Using the slopes of the indi¤erence curves given by (U1) and (U2), the conditions optimally hold with
equality and prots are maximized at the unique point at which the indi¤erence curves intersect. Let
j be the agent for whom qj   cj  qi   ci; then:
bi = ci   
2(qi ci) ( 1)(qj cj)
+(1 ) < ci b
i
i = qi;
bj = cj +
(qj cj) (1+)(qi ci)
+(1 ) T cj b
j
j = qj :
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Given (R1), if ci <
2(qi ci) ( 1)(qj cj)
+(1 ) then bi = 0 and bj is determined by indi¤erence. If
cj <  

(qj cj) (1+)(qi ci)
+(1 )

then bj = 0 and bi is determined by indi¤erence.
Case b): If (qi   ci) < ci and (qj   cj)  cj for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j, it is optimal to choose
bii = 0 and b
j
j = qj: The two cases are created by whether the intersection of both indi¤erence curves
occurs at a point where bi   ci S bj   cj:
- Let (qi   ci) < ci and (qj   cj)  cj : Then
bii = 0 b
j
j = qj; and:
- For (qj   cj)  ci then:
bi = ci   ci + (1  )(qj   cj)
+ (1  ) < ci bj = cj +
(qj   cj)  (1 + )ci
+ (1  ) T cj :
Given (R1), if ci <
ci+(1 )(qj cj)
+(1 ) then bi = 0 and bj is determined by indi¤erence.If cj <
 

(qj cj) (1+)ci
+(1 )

then then bj = 0 and bi is determined by indi¤erence:
- For (qj   cj) < ci then:
bi = ci +
2ci   (1 + )(qj   cj)
+ (1  ) > ci bj = cj  
2(qj   cj) + (1  )ci
+ (1  ) < cj :
Given (R1), if cj <
2(qj cj)+(1 )ci
+(1 ) then and bj = 0 and bi is determined by indi¤erence:
Case c): If (qi   ci) < ci for i = 1; 2, inequity o¤ equilibrium would be maximized by setting
bii = 0 and b
j
j = qj: However the equilibrium of the game played by the agents would not be unique.
Inequity o¤-equilibrium has to be the maximum possible subject to one of the agents obtaining higher
utility when he individually works than when he does not. Thus, one of the agents is o¤ered a bonus
equal to all available output when he individually works hard instead of no bonus. Therefore, o¤-
equilibrium one agent su¤ers the maximum e¤ect of guilt when he shirks while the other su¤ers the
maximum e¤ect of envy ( bii = 0 and b
j
j = qj for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j). Thus, one of the indi¤erence curves
is satised at the optimal level (for the agent who su¤ers guilt when he shirks) while the other
is satised at the suboptimal level (for the agent who su¤ers envy when he shirks). The optimal
bonuses paid are obtained at the intersection of one of the optimal and one of the suboptimal
indi¤erence curves. The conditions indicate for which of the four possible cases, prots are maximized.
- Let (qi   ci) < ci , (qj   cj) < cj : Then for cj  ci :
- For (qj   cj)  ci :
- if (1  2)[(qj   cj)  cj ]  (1 + 2)[(qi   ci)  ci]; then:
bi = ci   ci+(1 )(qj cj)+(1 ) < ci bii = 0,
bj = cj +
(qj cj) (1+)ci
+(1 ) S cj b
j
j = qj ;
Given (R1), if ci <
ci+(1 )(qj cj)
+(1 ) then bi = 0 and bj is determined by indi¤erence. If
cj <  

(qj cj) (1+)ci
+(1 )

then bj = 0 and bi is determined by indi¤erence:
- if (1  2)[(qj   cj)  cj ] < (1 + 2)[(qi   ci)  ci]; then:
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bi = ci   
2(qi ci)+(1 )cj
+(1 ) < ci b
i
i = qi,
bj = cj +
2cj (1+)(qi ci)
+(1 ) S cj b
j
j = 0:
Given (R1), if ci <
2(qi ci)+(1 )cj
+(1 ) then bi = 0 and bj is determined by indi¤erence. If cj <
 

2cj (1+)(qi ci)
+(1 )

then bj = 0 and bi is determined by indi¤erence:
- For (qj   cj) < ci :
- if (1 + 2)(qj   cj   qi + ci)  (1  2)(cj   ci); then:
bi = ci +
2ci (1+)(qj cj)
+(1 ) > ci b
i
i = 0;
bj = cj   
2(qj cj)+(1 )ci
+(1 ) < cj b
j
j = qj ;
Given (R1), if cj <
2(qj cj)+(1 )ci
+(1 ) then bi = 0 and bj is determined by indi¤erence:
- if (1 + 2)(qj   cj   qi + ci) < (1  2)(cj   ci); then:
bi = ci   
2(qi ci)+(1 )cj
+(1 ) < ci b
i
i = qi;
bj = cj +
2cj (1+)(qi ci)
+(1 ) S cj b
j
j = 0:
Given assumption (R1), if ci <
2(qi ci)+(1 )cj
+(1 ) then bi = 0 and bj is determined by indi¤erence.
If cj <  

2cj (1+)(qi ci)
+(1 )

then bj = 0 and bi is determined by indi¤erence:
Proof of Corollary 1
From Proposition 4, there are three possible cases:
-If bi = ci   (   1)(qj   cj)  
2(qi   ci)
   1   ; bj = cj  
(qj   cj)  (1 + )(qi   ci)
   1   then
bi + bj = ci + cj   (1  2)(qj   cj) + (1 + 2)(qi   ci)
   1   < ci + cj by (C), (U1) and (U2).
- If bi = ci ci + (1  )(qj   cj)
1 +    and bj = cj 
(1 + )ci   (qj   cj)
1 +    then,
bi + bj = ci + cj +
(1 + 2)ci + (1  2)(qj   cj)
   1   < ci + cj by (C), (U1) and (U2).
- If bi = ci (1 + )(qj   cj)  
2ci
1 +    and bj = cj 
(1  )ci + 2(qj   cj)
1 +    then,
bi + bj = ci + cj +
(1 + 2)(qi   ci) + (1  2)cj
   1   < ci + cj by (C), (U1) and (U2).
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Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of Corollary 1 shows the three possible rewards paid in equilibrium depending on
conditions in Proposition 4. Conditions for the principal to nd optimal to implement team extra
level of production under the three possible sets of equilibrium bonuses paid when agents are inequity
averse are:
- If bi = ci  
2(qi ci) ( 1)(qj cj)
+(1 ) and bj = cj +
(qj cj) (1+)(qi ci)
+(1 ) ; then joint production is
optimal when qi > 1  cj   (1+2)(qi ci)+(1 2)(qj cj)+(1 ) :
- If bi = ci   ci+(1 )(qj cj)+(1 ) and bj = cj + (qj cj) (1+)ci+(1 ) ; then joint production is optimal
when qi > 1  cj + (1+2)ci+(1 2)(qj cj)+(1 ) :
- If bi = ci +
2ci (1+)(qj cj)
+(1 ) and bj = cj   
2(qj cj)+(1 )ci
+(1 ) ; then joint production is optimal
when qi > 1  cj + (1+2)(qi ci)+(1 2)cj+(1 ) :
- Otherwise, the principal implements individual production by the agent for which qi   ci is
highest.
Given restrictions on the parameters and comparing with Section 3.3, the result is straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 6
Bonuses paid in the equilibrium of the game (bii; b
j
j) appear in ICC
ind
i and ICC
ind
j . By (R2) the
value of the right hand side of ICCindi is zero and both agents obtain the same utility when they both
shirk. As  > 0, the only possible way to make condition ICCindi hold under a lower total bonus cost
is by setting bii   ci  bij : However, by (R1), bij  0; and thus, bii  ci: The minimum bonus needed to
be paid in equilibrium are thus bii = ci and b
i
j = 0:
Proof of Proposition 7
As  < 0; agents only obtain disutility from envy. To maximize the e¤ect of envy o¤ the joint
production equilibrium, the agent who shirks o¤ equilibrium is o¤ered no bonus (bji = 0 for i; j = 1; 2
and i 6= j) and the agent who works is o¤ered all available production (bii = qi for i = 1; 2). The
expression for the equilibrium bonuses paid follows calculations in case a) in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 8
Assume agent i individually works hard o¤ the equilibrium of the game. E¢ ciency concerns implies
that agents care for the weighted sum of direct utilities, putting more weight on each owns direct
utility than on the other agents direct utility:
a) If Uj  Ui, agent is utility can be written as (1 + )Ui   U2, which is a weighted sum since
 < 0 and jj < 12 :
b) If Uj < Ui, agent is utility can be written as (1   )Ui + U2, which is a weighted sum since
 2 [0; 12 ):
For ICCindi to hold, agent i must obtain non-negative utility when he works given that agent j
shirks. Assume bii < ci; then it is necessary that b
i
j > ci   bii as jj < 12 : Obviously, given (R1), this
implies bii + b
i
j  ci: Finally, bii  ci cannot be optimal as it implies bii + bij  ci: Notice that bii = ci
and bij = 0 is not the only possible combination such that the condition holds.
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Proof of Proposition 9
To maximize the e¤ect of ine¢ ciency o¤-equilibrium, all agents should be o¤ered no bonus o¤-
equilibrium, no matter whether they work hard or not. However, by doing so, no production would be
an equilibrium as ICCJPUi for i = 1; 2 would not hold. Thus, working has to be a dominant strategy
for one of the agents (agent i). For ICCJPUi to hold but at the same time not provide incentives
for agent j to shirk when agent i individually works, it is optimal to set bii = ci and b
i
j = 0: When
agent j individually works, maximum ine¢ ciency is generated by setting bji = b
j
j = 0: The remaining
two equilibrium bonuses are obtained at the intersection between the minimum lines dened by both
ICCJPi s for i = 1; 2 :
bi   ci   (bi   ci   bj + cj)  0,
bj   cj   (bi   ci   bj + cj)   ci;
which yields: bi = ci +
2
1+  ci and bj = cj   (1 )1+  ci:
Notice that the sum of bonuses paid in equilibrium equals bi+ bj = ci+ cj   (1 2)1+  ci: As  < 0;
 2 [0; 1=2); and jj  jj then (1 2)1+  > 0 and thus, it is optimal to set bjj = cj for the agent for
which the cost of e¤ort is lowest, i.e., for cj > ci and i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
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